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Abstract
Standard logical systems enjoy the properties of reexivity, idempotence, monotony. The latter
property has been dropped in articial intelligence systems devoted to model drawing tentative
conclusions. Up to now, all attempts to characterizing these so-called non-monotone systems
are unsatisfactory because these attempts either take absence of monotony as their major char-
acteristics or give a collection of properties that also tolerate monotone systems. In contrast,
we introduce in the context of non-constructive logics a characterization that indeed furnishes
necessary and sucient conditions for a system to be non-monotone. c© 2000 Elsevier Science
B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Motivation
Logical systems have traditionally been monotone. Articial Intelligence has intro-
duced non-monotone systems (in order to capture tentative conclusions). A crucial
issue in connection with such systems is that of a characterizing theory. On the one
hand, there have been proposals to weakening a theory of monotone systems so as to
make it encompass non-monotone systems but the resulting theory trivially falls short
of delineating non-monotony. On the other hand, failure of monotony cannot serve as
a founding feature because no theory worthy of the name is based on the mere absence
of a property, which amounts to a negative denition.
Scholars working in the eld have been aware of this but seem to have overlooked
the fact that some negative denitions can still be given a more valuable characteriza-
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tion. A famous example comes from lattice theory [1]. Modular non-distributive lattices
are of course those modular lattices that fail distributivity. This seems as negative as
it can be. Yet, the very same class of lattices can be characterized as those modular
lattices of which M5 is a sub-lattice. We show below that the same idea of exploit-
ing substructures of the objects under consideration provides classes of non-monotone
systems with an insightful characterization. Indeed, we show that (non-constructive)
non-monotone systems are, in an appropriate context, proper extensions of monotone
systems.
2. Formal development
To start with, a word about notation is in order although all notation in the paper
is standard. First of all, a language is xed and throughout the text, we consider only
formulas from that language. The symbols S and T denote sets of formulas while
A and B denote formulas. Both ‘ and j stand for inference relations (each consist-
ing of pairs (S; A) expressing that A is inferred from S). However, ‘ is reserved
for monotone systems whereas j is used for systems that intuitively fail monotony.
Finally, set union is abbreviated using commas. For instance, S; A‘B means that
B can be concluded from the premises consisting of S unioned with the singleton
set fAg.
The systems ‘ are classical in the sense that they satisfy the requirement of being
a consequence relation [4]:
 S‘A whenever A2S (reexivity).
 If S‘A for all A2T and T;U‘B then S;U‘B (cut).
An important property obtained from reexivity and cut is:
 If S‘A then S;T‘A (monotony).
To help the reader grasp the essence of the characterization given by the main
theorem, we rst give a simplied version of it that relies on a few conventions. These
consist of introducing the symbol > for truth, the symbol ? for inconsistency and :
as negation. In addition to these symbols being introduced into the language, they also
have an eect on the systems ‘ and j so that negation and inconsistency are related
in the obvious manner
S; A;:A‘?
and the symbol > denotes the correct tentative conclusion
S j >
(ensuring that j always yields a non-empty set of conclusions).
As for focusing on non-constructive systems, we choose reductio ad absurdum as
the paradigm for indirect reasoning: In order to conclude A, assume its negation and
then exhibit a contradiction. That is, by being a non-constructive consequence relation,
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we mean that ‘ must additionally satisfy:
If S;:A‘? then S‘A:
The idea of our characterization is that a non-constructive non-monotone system j
is based on a consequence relation ‘ such that j is a proper extension of ‘.
By j being an extension of ‘, we mean that for all S and A, if S‘A then S j A.
Of course, such an extension is proper when the converse does not hold.
That j is based on ‘ has two aspects. The rst is that ‘ must provide a notion
of deductive closure (at least for single formulas). The corresponding requirement is
right weakening [6]. It states that whatever conclusion A is obtained by virtue of j
legitimates all consequences of A by ‘ to be concluded as well according to j. The
only other requirement is that consistency of ‘ must be preserved by j, which is the
most natural constraint.
All this can now be given shape as follows.
Theorem 1. Let ‘ be a non-constructive consequence relation and j an inference
relation such that the following conditions are satised:
(1) If S j A and S; A‘B then S j B.
(2) If S j ? then S‘?.
Then; j fails monotony i it is a proper extension of ‘.
Proof. ()) Assuming that j fails monotony, there exist S; T and A such that
S j A and S;T 6j A. Assume further that j is an improper extension of ‘ (in
other words, j and ‘ are the same). Then, S‘A and S;T 0 A which contradicts
the fact that ‘ is monotone. There only remains to be shown that j is an extension
of ‘. If S‘A then S;>‘A by monotony of ‘. In view of S j >, applying (1)
yields S j A. (() Assume that j is monotone while being a proper extension
of ‘. So, there exist S and A such that S j A and S 0 A. By the monotony
assumption, S;:A j A. Now, S;:A; A‘?. Applying (1) gives S;:A j ?. Using
(2), S;:A‘?. Non-constructiveness yields S‘A which contradicts the assumption.
The claim for characterization of non-monotony in the context of non-constructive
systems is substantiated by the equivalence in the theorem and the fact that the re-
quirements imposed upon j are widely accepted in the literature.
Observe that Condition (1) allows for multiple-conclusion systems to be based on
single-conclusion systems (default logic [3] is an illustration). Indeed, Condition (1)
is the least committed version of right weakening because it simply imposes that sets
of conclusions are locally closed under ‘ but this does not mean that fA j S j Ag
is closed under ‘ for all S. Writing Cn and Th as the operations for j and ‘ resp.,
Condition (1) merely expresses that if A2Cn(S) then Th(S [ fAg)Cn(S) but
Th(Cn(S))=Cn(S), namely full closure, need not hold. Such a feature can be found
in default logic, a well-known non-monotone system where Cn(W) can contain A and
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B while not containing A^B; : : : (but Cn(W) contains all classical consequences of
A such as B!A^B; : : : and the same for B). As another example, consider a logic
where A is concluded whenever A has a probability greater than 23 . From the formula
E stating that an enumeration of a nite set containing the item i is given, both the
formulas F and L can be concluded (F stating that i is in the rst two-third of the
enumeration and L stating that i is in the last two-third of the enumeration). That is,
E j F and E j L. However, E 6j F ^L.
As for generality, we know of no published non-constructive non-monotone system
that does not fall under the above characterization, which captures default logic (ex-
cept for the degenerate class of default theories with no extensions), circumscription
(except for the degenerate class of theories with no minimal models), logic program-
ming (except for the degenerate class of logic programs whose predicate completion
is inconsistent), and so on (cf. [3]).
Interestingly, the above characterization (and its proof!) can be embedded in a con-
ditional logic by means of a translation. Formulas are represented by propositional vari-
ables, ‘ by material implication  and j by the conditional connective !. Clearly,
failure of monotony for j corresponds to failure of transitivity for !.
Of course, reductio ad absurdum is no usual constraint in the context of non-
monotone systems as it simply rules out constructive systems. Indeed, let ‘ be intuition-
istic logic. Dene j as the smallest system based on ‘ (in the sense of
Condition (1)) that also satises S j (A!B)_ (B!A) for all A, B, and S (such a
system is unique, it is the well-known intermediate logic LC [2] { which is monotone).
Condition (2) is satised as well. In contrast, reductio ad absurdum is not.
3. Generalization
The previous theorem is not the best possible one, it was given in order to set the
scene. The main theorem is to be found below.
The approach below is fully general as no assumption is made about the language,
which is not required to be closed in any sense, and there need not be any specic
connective: There could even be none! In particular, neither > nor : need be in the
vocabulary. In the condition about indirect reasoning for example, negation of A in
the context S is implicit, it is represented by T which need not be equivalent to any
formula, which need not involve any particular symbol and which can even be innite.
The symbol ? is still used to indicate inconsistency but it now imposes no constraint
at all: In particular, it neither means that all contradictions are equivalent nor that every
formula is concluded from a contradiction. Notice that ? need not even be a formula!
For instance, S j ? could simply be a shorthand notation for the fact that S j B
for all B.
In the other direction, the language can include modal or intensional operators and
so on.
Another dimension for generality is compactness, that is not assumed either.
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Theorem 2. Let ‘ be a consequence relation and j an inference relation such that
the following conditions are satised:
(0) S j A for no A ) S‘A for no A.
(1) S j A; S; A‘B)S j B.
(2a) S j ?; S j A)S‘A.
(3) S 0 A; S; A 0 ?)S;T; A‘? for some T such that S;T 0 ?.
Then; j fails monotony i j and ‘ are distinct.
Theorem 2, of which Theorem 1 is actually a corollary, makes sense in view of the
next lemma.
Lemma 3. Let j and ‘ be as in the statement of Theorem 2. Then; j is an exten-
sion of ‘.
Proof. We rst prove the lemma. Given Condition (0), the only case of interest is when
S j B for some B. If S ‘ A then S; B‘A by monotony. According to Condition (1),
S j A. This nishes the proof of the lemma. Turning to the proof of the theorem,
the ()) direction is trivial. The (() direction can be proven as follows. Assume that
j is monotone. Assume further that j and ‘ are distinct. By the lemma, this implies
S j A and S 0 A for some S and A. Assume now S; A‘?. Since S j A, it
follows that S j ? (by Condition (1)). Applying (2a) yields S‘A and this is a
contradiction. Therefore, S; A 0 ?. Then, S;T; A‘? and S;T 0 ? for some T
(Condition (3)). Since S j A and j is monotone, S;T j A. As S;T; A‘?, it
follows that S;T j ? by (1). Since S;T 0 ?, (2a) is violated and a contradiction
arises.
Condition (0) about non-emptiness is no lack of generality because it is always
possible to introduce the additional special symbol > that is to be concluded whatever
set of premises. Even such a device is not necessary for the very many well-known
systems where reexivity holds (S j A whenever A 2S) so that there only remains
the pathological situation where j A for no A but ‘ B for some B (to nd out
how pathological it is, observe that Kleene’s three-valued logic [5] ‘K for instance is
unproblematic as ‘K has no theorem, hence jK having no theorem either does not
make ‘K and jK to be distinct from each other!).
Condition (2a) is no real restriction on Condition (2) as it simply states that there
are no purely tentative conclusions in a contradictory setting. Trivially, Condition (2a)
implies Condition (2). They even are equivalent for many well-known logics (including
classical logic).
Condition (3) { which actually generalizes reductio ad absurdum { is no longer
indirect reasoning stricto sensu. It somehow means that ‘ admits a (possibly implicit)
non-constructive negation for some formulas with respect to some theories (in all cases
where A is undetermined, i.e., neither A is concluded nor its addition yields a contra-
diction, then there exists a set of formulas that contradict A and only A).
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Out of the properties of non-monotone systems as discussed by various authors [3],
the two most uncontroversial ones hold for the systems under consideration here. The
rst one states that j is an extension of ‘ (Lemma 3) and is called supraclassicality
when taking ‘ to be classical logic: If S‘A then S j A for all S and A. The
second one is reexivity, that fails only in the degenerate case of empty non-monotone
systems.
To conclude about generality, the above characterization need not have Left Logical
Equivalence, Cautious Cut, Restricted Monotony and others [6] to hold whereas they
are usually viewed as basic postulates in the literature on the subject (a rather defective
opinion actually because most existing non-monotone systems violate at least one of
these properties).
4. Conclusion
Based on standard consequence relations, a class of inference relations is dened
in this note by means of a few simple, yet natural and general, properties. We then
prove that for all such systems, failure of monotony is equivalent to being a proper
extension of its underlying monotone system, thereby giving an exact characterization
of non-monotony for non-constructive systems.
As for constructive systems, the same principle applies but the details are more
complicated: It is not the case that any additional formula makes monotony to break
down { as the intermediate logics example shows. For such systems, the solution
presented here is not so insightful and a dierent approach should be sought for.
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